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and animals foreshadows shifting attitudes 
and real-world change. Read together, 
Kurt Remele’s investigation of Roman 
Catholic teaching on animals (pp. 142–49) 
and Margarita Carretero-González’s pas-
sionate critique of Catholicism’s complicity 
in bullfighting culture (pp. 286–94) strike 
me as (at the risk of some hyperbole) pro-
phetic. As both make devastatingly clear, 
indifference to suffering is at odds with the 
Catholic Church’s own teaching. There is 
in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, 
Remele argues, “a deep ambivalence” re-
garding animals (p. 146), and for Carret-
ero-González, consideration of “the preva-
lent Catholic attitudes toward bullfighting 
is enough to dishearten any animal libera-
tionist brought up in the faith” (p. 291). 
At the same time, both remain cautiously 
optimistic (e.g., pp. 146–47; 291–92), and 
as they and others show, living religions 
are dynamic and capable of adapting to 
new situations and moral concerns, how-
ever slowly. These scholarly conversations 
about religious responses to animal suffer-
ing are in that sense open ended and (one 
hopes) a stimulus for continued debate, 
reform, and activism within communities 
of faith.
 I think it fair to say this collection is 
broadly accessible to nonspecialists. More 
than half of the chapters examine subjects 
in which I have no academic formation or 
extensive personal contact, but this is not 
a hindrance as most contributors carefully 
keep such readers in view. As a religiously 
motivated animal advocate, I find much 
here that inspires, even in studies largely 
removed from my own worldview. It is en-
couraging to discover fellow religionists—
ancient and modern—thinking so carefully 
and feeling so deeply about animals and hu-
man responsibilities toward them. I recom-
mend this important contribution without 
reservation.
Animals in Tillich’s Philosophical Theology. 
By Abbey-Anne Smith. (London, England: 
Palgrave Macmillan. Palgrave Macmillan 
Animal Ethics Series, 2017. pp. 257 + xv. 
Hardback. $109.99. ISBN: 978-3-319-
40855-2.)
Jeremy D. Yunt
Independent Scholar
Abbey-Anne Smith’s new book, Animals in 
Tillich’s Philosophical Theology, is a wel-
come addition to the burgeoning field of 
animal ethics. Since the book deals with 
both Tillich’s theology and animal ethics, 
it really can be seen as two books in one. 
For the reader who craves a well-rounded 
presentation of Tillich’s theology, Smith 
does an excellent job of laying out his basic 
theological (and some philosophical) con-
cepts. Then, by applying these concepts to 
his treatment of animals in relationship to 
both human ethics and theology, she helps 
us see the strengths and weaknesses of Til-
lich’s thought as it relates to our evolving 
views on animals in the modern world.
 Since I published a related book on 
Tillich’s relevance to ecophilosophy and 
environmental ethics in 2009—now up-
dated and retitled as Faithful to Nature: 
Paul Tillich and the Spiritual Roots of 
Environmental Ethics—I am aware of, 
and in much agreement with, Smith’s 
criticisms of Tillich. Though I approach 
Tillich primarily from the perspective of 
his philosophy, while Smith focuses more 
on his theology, we share similar goals re-
garding humanity’s ethics toward animals: 
a basic acknowledgment of their intrinsic 
worth such that we no longer use them as 
unnecessary objects of a human diet, for 
entertainment (circuses, marine “parks,” 
bullfights, rodeos, dog races), in unneces-
sary and cruel scientific research, or as ob-
jects of human vanity (furs, leather coats, 
shoes).
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 At the core of her book, Smith deftly ad-
dresses the nagging issue we both seemed 
to grapple with regarding Tillich’s place-
ment of animals in his thought; namely, 
how he can speak so precisely of human-
ity’s sinful and rapacious use of nature and 
the moral “perfection” of animals and yet 
fail to apply these insights in specific ways 
to the development of an animal ethic. In 
light of his incessant condemnation of the 
human tendency to commodify nature, Til-
lich must have been aware of the depth of 
animal suffering—since they are the most 
sentient nonhuman beings in nature. So 
why he didn’t speak about them in a more 
systematic way will remain somewhat of a 
mystery, especially since Tillich acknowl-
edges the profound impact Albert Sch-
weitzer’s “reverence for life” had on the 
development of his own life philosophy. 
Though Tillich does sometimes mention 
nonhuman animals quite sympathetically, 
Smith correctly observes that he really only 
goes so far as to imply that we should see 
animals as beings and not things.
 Smith does give her insight into why Til-
lich seems to have largely left animals out 
of his philosophy and theology. Like most 
theologians and ethicists of his time, he re-
mained in the grip of anthropocentricism, 
giving almost exclusive theological signifi-
cance to humans. Tillich’s high ontological 
valuation of humanity rested on the fact that 
we have an advanced rationality, as well as 
a sense of history—meaning we possess the 
intellectual capabilities to purposively trans-
form the world we see and comprehend. 
For Tillich, these characteristics seemingly 
make only humans ultimately significant 
to God, or the Ground of Being. And for 
Smith this is a problem, because it means 
Tillich “sees the world from a humanocen-
tric perspective, rather than a theocentric 
one, and this leads him back to a hierar-
chical vantage point with humans placed 
firmly at the top of the order” (p. 155). She 
answers this limitation of his by proposing 
that, instead, we should base “our sense of 
worth on our faithfulness to the instructions 
of our Creator to protect and value the rest 
of the created order, rather than to base 
our worth (and that of every other species) 
on ontological attributes, and specifically, 
intellectual capacity” (p. 155).
 Tillich’s persistent focus on humanity 
would seem to limit his relevance to envi-
ronmental and animal ethics. But, as Smith 
admits, it’s a bit more complex than this: “At 
first glance, Tillich’s highly abstract System-
atic Theology does not seem to provide a 
great deal of material for developing a practi-
cal ethical stance on any contemporary issue. 
This first impression, however, is mislead-
ing” (p. 174). There’s no denying that Tillich’s 
writing is often quite abstract and human 
centered. That said, he still stands out among 
the theologians of his time as one of few who 
was deeply concerned about humanity’s re-
lationship to the natural world. And Smith 
shows us this by pointing to his sermons, the 
place we find Tillich expressing a much more 
personal, even poetic, sensibility about the 
plight of animals at the hands of a humanity 
estranged from itself, nature, and God. Here, 
Tillich seems more at ease in expressing his 
deep sympathy for the nonhuman animals 
on whom we inflict so much suffering. With 
that in mind, Smith rightly encourages the 
reader interested in animal ethics to turn to 
his sermons for Tillich’s deepest and clearest 
sentiments on the subject.
 But it is in his Systematic Theology 
where Tillich spends the most time de-
veloping a doctrine of life relevant to our 
views on animals. This is most apparent in 
his unique Lebensphilosophie, which he 
calls the “multidimensional unity of life.” 
It is here that Smith brings some serious 
challenges to Tillich’s relevance to animal 
ethics.
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 Among other purposes, Tillich uses his 
life philosophy to debunk the antiscience 
theories of theological supernaturalism, 
thereby emphasizing our biological and 
evolutionary ties to the rest of all other 
forms of life. He does this by describing the 
structure of life and existence metaphori-
cally in terms of intersecting “dimensions,” 
rather than through the metaphor “level,” 
which he thought created a hierarchy with 
humans at the top. But Smith challenges the 
efficacy of such a move. Again, while Tillich 
thought he was overcoming the division of 
reality into an anthropocentric hierarchy, 
Smith argues that his criteria for judging 
a being’s worth ultimately comes down to 
whether or not the being participates in 
the dimensions of existence Tillich sees as 
significant to God—history and spirit. For 
Tillich, animals are largely confined to the 
inorganic, organic, and, in some cases, psy-
chological dimensions.
 While Tillich is absolutely correct that 
humans have an ontological stature uniquely 
different than other animals, Smith is apt to 
point out how this uniqueness should not be 
used to exploit and dominate other beings. 
Rather, our uniqueness should place upon 
us a moral imperative to care for the created 
order—particularly sentient nonhuman ani-
mals—regardless of whether they can speak 
or have advanced cognitive abilities. In fact, 
this imperative is why we take extra care of 
children and intellectually disabled human 
adults, a point advocates for animal rights 
often use to highlight the inherent specie-
sist bias in our ethics. Framed as a ques-
tion: If intellectual ability is foundational 
to our ethics—which Smith points out as 
significant to Tillich’s own ethics—then why 
give moral priority and special care to these 
cognitively stunted human groups, when 
we deny such care to more cognitively ad-
vanced species such as dolphins, gorillas, 
and elephants?
 Smith considers that Tillich’s limited 
knowledge of animal consciousness and 
emotionality might be to blame for the re-
stricted theological placement of animals in 
his system. And she introduces the reader 
to the relatively new academic discipline 
of cognitive ethology to highlight this limi-
tation. Only making its appearance in the 
1970s (after Tillich’s death), cognitive ethol-
ogy is already giving us greater insight into 
the emotional, social/moral, and intellectual 
lives of animals. For example, we can ob-
serve the elaborate behavior of certain ani-
mals, such as elephants, when confronted 
with the death of one of their members; the 
behavior seems to indicate a more complex 
emotional, one might even say “spiritual,” 
response to mortality than we previously as-
sumed. Though the research is difficult and 
ongoing, such observations may lead us to 
posit that some animals do, in fact, partici-
pate in a larger understanding of existence 
than we currently give them credit for. 
Thus, regarding Tillich’s system, Smith is 
right to point out how such new knowledge 
seems to undermine his belief that animals 
do not have as much ontological complex-
ity as he assumed. Tillich was keenly aware 
that every system of thought, including his 
own, is susceptible to new, challenging in-
sights that might call some of it into ques-
tion. Smith shows us how current findings in 
cognitive ethology may just be one of these 
significant challenges to his system.
 For all her questioning of Tillich’s rel-
evance for animal ethics, Smith eventually 
concludes that two particular theological 
doctrines of his can help advance a strong 
animal ethic: eschatological panentheism 
(Universal Salvation) and the Fall. She 
states that “the concept of Universal Salva-
tion, along with the notion that the ‘Fall’ 
effects the whole of creation, is very positive 
with respect to nonhuman animals in par-
ticular and creation in general . . .” (p. 138). 
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In short, since Tillich sees all of creation as 
participating in the universal estrangement 
characterizing existence (though he some-
what ambiguously also says that animals are 
“morally perfect”), he shows us that animals 
share in the ultimate fate of all life, includ-
ing the fate of humanity. Tillich says exactly 
this in his most forceful support for the idea 
that animals, humans, and the rest of nature 
are bound together in the multidimensional 
unity of life: “For there is no salvation of 
man [sic] if there is no salvation of nature, 
for man is in nature and nature is in man” 
(p. 230).
 Smith’s book is a highly informative and 
original work that contributes in significant 
ways to both Tillich scholarship and the im-
portant field of animal ethics. It’s a must-
read for those who care about the fate of 
humanity as well as the elimination of cruel, 
needless suffering of animals at the hands 
of humans.
Animal Labor and Colonial Warfare. By 
James L. Hevia. (Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press, 2018. 328 + xiv pp. with 
black and white illustrations. Paper. $30.00. 
ISBN: 978-0-226-56228-5.)
Kendra Coulter
Brock University, Canada
Historian James L. Hevia provides an exten-
sive and detailed look at how animals were 
used as part of the British colonial project, 
with a particular focus on south Asia and 
Afghanistan in the mid to late 19th and early 
20th century. The animals considered are 
those that were employed by the British 
military: camels, donkeys, mules, and, to a 
lesser degree, horses.
 In keeping with historical scholarly prac-
tice, the story is told primarily through the 
careful piecing together of archival sources. 
When seeking to uncover the role of ani-
mals, historians may revisit previously inter-
preted sources but use a more-than-human 
lens, or seek out distinct materials given less 
attention in the writing of anthropocentric 
history. The growing interest in environ-
mental and animal histories, combined with 
the diligent work of historians, is helping us 
better understand humans’ past, animals’ 
earlier roles, and the multispecies nature 
of all of world history.
 This book has a sweeping topical reach. 
There is extensive explanation of the evolv-
ing nature of British military strategy and 
infrastructure in these regions. Hevia offers 
an intriguing outline of the development 
of veterinary science and knowledge dis-
semination. Careful attention is also given 
to the two primary processes through which 
animals were acquired. The first is military 
impressment, the taking of local people’s 
animals, a process not unique to this time 
period or place. The second is breeding, 
including through transnational trade and 
importation. There is also some consider-
ation of the people employed to work with 
and care for the animals directly. At its core, 
the book is about human (mis)management 
of pack animals in the context of military 
and colonial relations.
 Hevia begins with two different sets of 
questions, one provided in the preface, the 
other in the book’s introduction. The ques-
tions posed in the introduction concentrate 
primarily on how historical human actors 
relate and conceptualize the animals toiling 
for the military, and Hevia provides some 
answers, as they pertain to the specifics of 
the British imperial project.
 The questions asked in the preface raise 
more substantive issues with the contradic-
tions and complexities of not only using but 
remembering animals’ roles in military and 
colonial campaigns, and how these dynam-
ics are entangled with understandings of 
service, contribution, and sacrifice. Given 
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